Physique and Mental Illness SIR,-I agree with Dr. R. W. Parnell (Journal, August 10, p. 351) that some of the controversy over the relationship of physique to disease is dependent upon the different statistical interpretation of results. For example, Feigenbaum and Howat' denied the validity of Draper's2 claims that there are physical characteristics distinctive of patients with diabetes mellitus, peptic ulcer, and cholecystitis. The Leeds figures show that there is no significant relationship between somatotype and unspecified mental disorder (2 = 5.92; P about 0.3), or between somatotype and first-class honours group (x2=7.57; P about 0.2).
For the students' benefit severe cases are treated in the University of Leeds Student Health Department with the close liaison of the University Department of Psychiatry. Also many of the Leeds cases were hospital in-patients or out-patients. Although the Oxford patients contain a higher proportion of schizophrenics it is difficult to believe that difference in selection is entirely responsible for the highly significant correlation between somatotype and psychiatric illness claimed by Dr. Pamell' and the lack of significant correlation found at Leeds. Finally one would expect mesomorphs to be the best examination performers, as they are the commonest somatotypes amongst the students; at Leeds, in proportion to their number, they do not perform any better or worse than the other somatotypes.-I am, etc., Leeds He argues first that the justice's order at present necessary for compulsory admission contributes to the "stigma " of certification and of mental disease in general. Now, by immemorial tradition and universal assent, powers over the subject's liberty, however weak and ill he might be, have resided with the judiciary. The cruelty of princes, the rapacity of barons, the ambition of governments have constantly, since the time of Magna Charta, been chastened and subdued by this same essential principle of independent justice. It is therefore by no accident that the justice's order should be required for certification ; it is a reminder and firm insistence that, where so absolute a sanction as incarceration sine die is to be summarily imposed, the action should at least have the approval of a representative of that body which, so far from having as a " main function . . . the punishment of crime," has over the centuries been the greatest, and very often the only, champion of individual liberty in the country. Thus, apart from any considerations of the social hazards of mental disease, the justice's order may more fairly be regarded not as a stigma but as a feature ennobling what would otherwise be an unconstitutional and unprecedented seizure of an individual subject.
Dr. Walk suggests that the psychiatrist already undertakes the responsibility for compulsory detention. "Our patients are not deceived and know where the responsibility lies." Of course the doctor is responsible for his opinion on his patient's condition, but it is no more than advice; responsibility for the act of arrest itself lies with the justice of the peace, whose responsibility is in no way diminished by the psychiatrist's right to discharge his patient. Surely it is true that a physician can only offer advice; the phrase "doctor's orders " is, and should remain, meaningless.
Dr. Walk concludes that the answer lies in the provision of " review tribunals ' following " informal practice." For myself, were my personal liberty at stake, I should many times prefer the opinion of a magistrate's court, however "litigious," to any tribunal, informal though it may be. " Tribunal "-it is no accident that the world should inspire dread: from the time of the French Revolution tribunals have been proposed as alternatives to orthodox courts. Unconstitutional, summary, from them there is no appeal; they represent the extreme triumph of the executive power over the common law. I hope that psychiatrists will continue to decline the responsibility for compulsory detention of their patients. 
